By Lily Penaranda

In nineteen (19) days, Donald J. Trump dismantled seven (7) decades of Foreign Policy that allowed the United States to design the world order and be the global hegemon.

In the 1950s, the United States introduced a new Foreign Policy strategy using countries like Bolivia as a testing ground. This new strategy consisted of offering Development Aid in exchange for political and economic concessions that promoted the new world order and the interests of this new great hegemon in commercial and economic terms.

What were the hermeneutics of the new strategy?

The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, or Public Law 83-480, had the purpose of: "...to expand international trade among the United States and friendly nations, to facilitate the convertibility of currency, to promote the economic stability of American agriculture and the national welfare, to make maximum efficient use of surplus agricultural commodities in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States,… to pay United States obligations abroad, to promote collective strength, and to foster in other ways the foreign policy of the United States."

The Act to promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward economic and social development and internal and external security, and for other purposes, also known as the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or Public Law 87-195, creates the United States Agency for International Development or USAID to execute the policy.

These are two of many laws that transparently and clearly manifested a Foreign Policy strategy that offered economic, food, or technical aid in exchange for concessions such as the elimination of communists from government positions, laws favouring American investors, or a loan portfolio with interesting rates for American and Bretton Woods banks (World Bank and International Monetary Fund).

During the initial testing period in Bolivia, between April 1952 and late 1953, the strategy did not guarantee results; however, by 1954, the State Department was certain that the new Foreign Policy strategy worked.

An intelligence report issued by the U.S. State Department on March 19, 1954, concludes that: "When the MNR first came to power, domestic political exigencies and its uncertainty as to US intentions made it quite critical of the US. As a result of subsequent US aid and the tolerant US attitude toward the regime, however, the MNR has become increasingly pro-US in its outlook and has taken the position that Bolivia's interests will be best served by cooperating with the US."

This report refers to the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), the revolutionary political party that in April 1952 swept tin oligarchs from Bolivia's political and economic sphere, including the pro-American political elite they funded for decades. (Read The international development paradigm and the development process of Bolivia 1952– 2022 for further details).

More research is required to determine if this new Foreign Policy strategy was tested in other countries simultaneously. However, it is no coincidence that the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 83-480) was enacted 4 months after the report.

Undeniably, the precursor to this strategy was the Marshall Plan, which played a crucial role in the reconstruction of Europe following World War II.

A notable aspect in the international sphere is that the United States has effectively influenced other actors to comply with its objectives without resorting to force, but rather through strategic conditioning. This approach exemplifies a successful Foreign Policy and efficient power accumulation strategy. The concept of "soft power" thereby gains significance in Foreign Policy.

For 70 years, the United States led this strategy, inspiring Bretton Woods institutions and other great and middle Western powers to do so as well.

The strategy began to lose effectiveness when George W. Bush chose not to comply with the United Nations Security Council's decision against the invasion of Iraq in 2003, following the conflict in Afghanistan in 2001. This marked the first instance where the primary architect of international norms did not adhere to directives from the global governance system it had established and led for many years. Iraq and Afghanistan signify the initial step in abandoning the soft power strategy and the principles of Foreign Policy based on a relatively orderly global governance scheme institutionalized by conditioning principles.

These mistakes reduced the hegemony and power of the United States, resulting in a radical change in international politics and the discrediting of the United Nations. Furthermore, the 2008 financial crisis, which resulted in a global economic downturn, negatively impacted the condition-based Foreign Policy strategy due to a reduction in funding. The lack of a solid objective for USAID and its current inefficiency is compelling evidence of this.

In December 2019, Donald J. Trump enacted the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, or Public Law 116-94. Title V includes the Global Fragility Act of 2019, which aims to execute: "... the policy of the United States to seek to stabilize conflict-affected areas and prevent violence and fragility globally, including …enhancing the effectiveness of United States foreign assistance programs and activities to carry out such policy, ...to contribute to the stabilization of conflict-affected areas, address global fragility, and strengthen the capacity of the United States to be an effective leader of international efforts to prevent extremism and violent conflict."

This approach to foreign assistance starkly differs from the previous approach that utilized foreign assistance programs to further US interests globally. Instead, this new Law focuses on preventing global conflict to restore the US as an effective global leader. It ignores the conditionality-based strategy in exchange for political and economic concessions to promote US interests abroad. It ignores soft power strategies all in all. Hence, It can be inferred that 21st-century US policymakers ignore the role USAID and foreign assistance played in making "America great".

During Joe Biden's administration, the execution of this Act was a failure due to over-bureaucratization and insufficient program funding. Given the resounding failure of efforts to redirect the once-successful Foreign Policy strategy that promoted US interests, the outbreak of significant inter-state conflicts after 2019, such as Ukraine against Russia and Israel against Palestine, is no surprise.

With new global actors and the balance of power increasingly tilting in favour of China, Trump resolves to throw away what was left of seventy (70) years of Foreign Policy strategy in nineteen (19) days. While George W. Bush had already weakened the model, Obama and Biden did nothing to restore it, but neither did they dismantle it. The little Donald J. Trump managed to do by enacting the Global Fragility Act did not work to reconduct the model.

In his current term, Trump finally decided to dismantle what remained of the USAID and the foreign assistance based Foreign Policy corpse, and resorted to direct and frontal commercial coercion. Mexico, Canada, and China are the first targets of this new Foreign Policy strategy. Although the commercial war with China started during Trump's first mandate, now it escalated to become a leading US strategy.

The little sophistication and its high level of improvisation make its long-term results unpredictable. Ideally, results from carefully designed and tested Foreign Policy strategy can be predicted. It is hard to know the outcome if the testing processes, with low-impact actors in international politics, are omitted. Mexico, Canada, and China are big fish, and the consequences, whatever they may be, are significant.

Frontal coercion is not a guarantee of success, it can be ignored or, in the worst case, countered with violence. Especially with regard to China, an actor in international politics with a constantly growing and developing army, capable of confronting the once sole world hegemon.

There is a probability that the US may regain some power in the international balance, reviving its role as a watchdog. Despite this, it will no longer be the sole hegemon. When the Soviet Union was its biggest problem, it did not compare to China's current capacity.

For Bolivia, this shift only generates uncertainty and no guarantee of stability in diplomatic relations with the American giant. As Bolivia is highly dependent on development cooperation, the danger is that dismantling USAID may trigger a chain reaction in European countries that use the same mechanism to promote their interests. Unlike USAID, European cooperation agencies work in Bolivia, injecting much-needed cash for projects mainly related to the environment, gender policies, and others.

Furthermore, Latin American right-wing politicians and civil society in general betted on Trump's administration to get rid of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, Ortega in Nicaragua, the MAS government in Bolivia, and other socialist projects in the region - greatly explaining the massive Latino vote for Trump during the latest general elections. The fact is that Donald J. Trump could not care less. The US backyard is not a priority to Washington at the moment. Migrants are an issue Trump wishes to get out of his hair, but the highly unstabilizing consequences of such anti-immigration policies, for Latin America, are not a concern to his administration. With the shift from a Foreign Policy based on foreign assistance to a frontal coercion strategy, global policy against poverty is wiped out as a mechanism to control migration in situ. This and other consequences of the US's policy shift are yet to be discussed and deepened.

For now, it can be concluded that the decline of U.S. soft power and the shift toward coercive strategies under Trump marks a pivotal moment in global politics. As China rises and traditional alliances fray, for countries like Bolivia, dependent on development aid and caught in the crossfire of great power competition, the stakes are high. The question is no longer whether the U.S. can reclaim its hegemony, but whether it can peacefully adapt to a world where power is shared.